In this paper, we employ the Communicating finite state machine (CFSM) model for networks to investigate fault management using passive testing. First, we introduce the concept of passive testing. Then, we introduce the CFSM model, the observer model and the fault model with necessary assumptions. We introduce the fault detection algorithm using passive testing. Then, we briefly present our new passive testing approach for fault location, fault identification, and fault coverage based on the CFSM model. We illustrate the effectiveness of our new technique through simulation of a practical protocol example, a 4-node mobile IPv6 network. Finally, conclusions and potential extensions are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid growth in Telecommunication networks and the fast evolution in technology, the need for a more efficient and effective network management approaches is becoming apparent. The International Standard Organization (ISO) has defined network management for the Open System Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer model in terms of five functional areas: fault management, configuration management, accounting management, performance management, and security management [11] . Our work focuses on fault management using formal techniques based on Finite State Machines (FSM) and Communicating Finite State Machines (CFSM.)
Fault management usually covers the following aspects: detection, location, identification, coverage and correction. The main objective of this research is to see how much fault management information we can obtain using passive testing only. Passive testing simply observes the normal traffic of the network, without adding any test messages. The simplest approaches to passive testing use a FSM specification to model the behavior of the network. Given an implementation of the network under test, it is viewed as a black box where only the input-output behavior is observable. The problem is to determine whether the behavior of the implementation conforms to the behavior of the specification. If it does not conform, this implies the existence of a fault.
Lee et al [1] apply passive testing on a FSM model of the network for fault detection. Their paper demonstrates effective fault detection capabilities of passive testing based on observation of the input/output sequence of the implementation. However, due to the limitation of the single FSM model, no fault isolation or fault location is possible. In [7] Miller presents a variant of the CFSM model to specify a network. Using this model he shows that some fault location information can be deduced. Miller and Arisha [2] demonstrate that better fault location is possible. As noted above, using passive testing to detect faults eliminates testing overhead normally encountered by other methods that inject special test messages into a network. Of course fault detection is not sufficient. Once a fault is detected, other remedial steps are required to eliminate the fault. Fault location helps by isolating the corrective actions to only a portion of the network. Thus, additional fault location capability by passive testing will be very useful if faults can be isolated to ever-smaller regions. Additionally, if the exact fault that occurs can be limited to a small set of possibilities, this will further simplify the corrective activities. This greater fault location and identification capability by passive testing is demonstrated here for the mobility support of the IPv6 protocol.
We describe the CFSM based specification model, the observer model, and the fault model with necessary assumptions in section 2. In section 3, we introduce a brief description of the fault detection algorithm using passive testing. Then, we describe our work for fault location, fault identification and fault coverage. Section 4 presents modeling and simulation of the IPv6 protocol for a 4-node mobile network, as well as simulation results to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Finally, conclusions and possible extensions are discussed in section 5.
II. THE MODEL
• s 0 is a designated initial state.
• δ: S × I S is the state transition function; • λ: S × I O is the output function.
• When the machine is in state s in S and receives an input a in I, it moves to the next state specified by δ(s, a) and produces an output given by λ(s, a).
We denote the number of states, inputs, and outputs by n = |S|, p = |I|, and q = |O|, respectively. Also the definition for the transition function δ and the output function λ can be extended from input symbols to strings as well. Starting from initial state s 0 , an input sequence x = a 0 ,a 1 Assumptions: We assume that if a fault occurs, only one fault occurs during a test cycle. We also assume that our FSMs are deterministic. For all unspecified input transitions, a fault should be detected. So all unspecified transitions will lead to an implicitly defined additional fault state with a new output called "f" to indicate "fault." This fault state is not an "original state" in the specification; it is used only to allow us to assume that the machines are completely specified. For more detail about justification of these assumptions, refer to [1] [2] [7] .
B. The CFSM Model
Representing a huge network by a single DFSM would result in a very large machine, whereas using a machine for each node provides a distributed representation with each machine being relatively simple. So, we choose to propose a variant of the Communicating Finite State Machines (CFSM), where the network is modeled as a set of machines, one for each node of the network, with channels connecting these nodes. This variant uses the Mealy model formulation rather than the send/receive labeling of transitions which is used in the original CFSM model, that is, here we have input/output labeling on transitions.
A CFSM consists of a set of machines M, and a set of channels C. We specify our network N=(M, C), where M= {m 1 • Each C ij ∈ C represents a communication channel from m i to m j . It behaves as a FIFO queue with m j taking inputs from the head of the queue and m i placing outputs into the tail of this queue for messages produced by m i that are intended for m j . According to our completeness assumption, we define also a set of fault states {F i } where each F i defines for each machine m i a common destination state for each transition whose output label is f ij .
C. The Observer
Each observer will be placed at a certain node in the network. Let A represent a machine specification at a node where the observer is placed. The observer is assumed to know the structure of A, so it can trace the input/output tuples observed with the specified state transitions of A. For the implementation machine B the observer sees the input/output behavior of the FSM representing this node as a black box, and the observer compares B's input/output sequence with the specified sequence of A.
Assumptions: We assume that the network topology of the implementation is the same as the specification. When more than one node of the network has an observer, we assume that there is some way to gather the information from these observers for fault analysis. The node is viewed as a black box FSM for the observer. For more detail about justification of these assumptions, refer to [2] [4].
D. The Fault Model
Due to our assumptions of the CFSM model, the three types of faults that we can investigate are:
Output Fault: This occurs when a transition has the same head and tail states and the same input as in the specification FSM, but the output is altered.
Tail State Fault: This occurs when a transition has the same head state and input/output symbols as specified, but the tail state is altered.
Channel Fault: This occurs when a channel corrupts a message (i.e. an input and/or output symbol)
Assumptions: Only a single fault exists on the network. Faults in the nodes are persistent, while faults in the channels are non-persistent.
III. FAULT DETECTION, LOCATION, IDENTIFICATION AND COVERAGE
Using the simple FSM model to represent a network, Lee et al [1] showed how to narrow the possible states, that the machine could be in, as successive input/output pairs were observed. Once this set of states became empty, it was known that the implementation behavior was not as specified by the FSM, and this indicated that a fault had been detected. An example of this approach is shown in figure 1. Miller [7] generalized the model to a two-node CFSM and showed that one could detect a fault by having an observer at only one of the nodes. He then showed that by inspecting the input/output pair in the observed sequence when the fault was detected, one could locate the fault to either the machine being observed, to the other machine, or to the two channels. The fault location results were improved and generalized to arbitrary node networks by Miller and Arisha [2] . Also they showed how to obtain fault identification to a small set of possible faults by analyzing the observed input/output sequence by a backward tracing method and comparing this with the forward trace, [3] [4] . Finally, fault coverage was also obtained by combining the tracing information to determine what percentage of faults was known to be detectable by the observed input/output sequence [5] [6] . For more details about our approach refer to [12] . Here, we report applying these passive testing based techniques to the mobility support for the IPv6.
IV.

APPLICATION ON IPv6 MOBILITY SUPPORT
To investigate the effectiveness of our passive testing based fault management approach; we model IPv6 mobility support with a 4-node CFSM model shown in figure 2 , and simulate our passive testing techniques. First we give a brief introduction for the mobility support of the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), and then we discuss the CFSM model, the simulation and the results.
With recent advances in wireless communication technology, mobile computing is an increasingly important area of research. A mobile system is one where independently executing components may migrate through some space during the course of the computation, and where the pattern of connectivity among the components changes as they move in and out of proximity [8] . IETF made efforts to standardize the introduction of the mobility to the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [9] [10] . IP version 4 assumes that a node's IP address uniquely identifies the node's point of attachment to the Internet. Therefore, a node must be located in the network indicated by its IP address in order to receive datagrams (connectionless packet data units) directed to it. The alternative mechanisms, proposed by IPv4, for a node to change its point of attachment without losing its ability to communicate, are unacceptable due to the difficulties in maintaining higher-layer connections and severe scaling problems. The IPv6 protocol is a new scalable mechanism to accommodate node mobility within the Internet. Mobile IP introduces the following new functional entities:
1) Mobile Node: a router that changes its point of attachment from one network to another. A mobile node may change its location without changing its IP address.
2) Home Agent: a router on a mobile node's home network which tunnels datagrams for delivery to the mobile node when it is away from home, and maintains current location information for the mobile node.
3) Foreign Agent:
A router on a mobile node's visited network that provides routing services to the mobile node when registered. The foreign agent de-tunnels and delivers datagrams to the mobile node that were tunneled by the mobile node's home agent. For datagrams sent by a mobile node, the foreign agent may serve as a default router for registered mobile nodes.
The mobile node is given a permanent IP address on a home network. When away from its home network, a "careof-address" is associated with the mobile node and reflects its current point of attachment. It uses its home address as source address of all datagrams that it sends. The following steps provide an outline of the operation of the mobile IP protocol:
• Mobility agents (i.e. foreign and home agents) advertise their presence via agent advertisement messages. In the absence of agent advertisements, a mobile node may optionally solicit an agent advertisement message from any locally attached mobility agents through an agent solicitation message. All mobility agents should respond to agent solicitation.
• A mobile node receives these agent advertisements and determines whether it is on its home network or not.
• When the mobile node detects that it is located on its home network, it operates without mobility services. If returning to its home network from being registered elsewhere, it deregisters with its home agent.
• When a mobile node detects that it has moved to a foreign network, it obtains a care-of-address on this network.
• The mobile node, operating away from home, registers its new care-of-address with its home agent through exchange of Registration messages with it.
• Home agent intercepts datagrams sent to the mobile node's home address, and tunnels them to the mobile node's careof-address. When received at the tunnel endpoint (either at the foreign agent or at the mobile node itself), datagrams are delivered to the mobile node. • In the reverse direction, datagrams sent by the mobile node are delivered using standard IP routing mechanisms.
As shown in figure 2, our model has two mobile nodes (A and B) moving randomly between the two networks. Each network has a mobility agent. We call the mobile agent of A's home network the "home agent", while the mobility agent of B's home network the "foreign agent". The links connecting the mobile nodes to the agents are wireless, while the link between the mobility agents may not be wireless. Using our CFSM model, we place an observer at each of the mobile Time is measured in atomic steps, where one atomic step is equivalent to the time it takes for a transition to be executed in one FSM (i.e. a node). The simulator reports the fault detection time since injection, the fault location information, the set of potential faults identified, and the fault coverage.
Running the experiment for 50,000 random faults, injected once at a time into the system, the final results for fault management are illustrated as follows.
It can be seen that most of the detection times lies at {4, 9}. The passive testing based fault management does not take long to detect the fault once injected. Since we are measuring here the detection time since fault injection, the detection time is independent of the observed sequence length.
It can be seen that almost half the time, the fault is located in just one entity (one node or one channel). About 25% of the time the fault is located in one node and one of its channels. With this observation, it reduces the uncertainty about fault location from the whole network to only a few entities. Figure 7 shows that the average number of identified potential faults mostly is between 5 and 6 faults. The smaller the set of identified potential set of faults, the simpler it is for a later fault correction process. In order to evaluate how much the fault identification shrunk the set of potential faults, for this CFSM model the total number of possible faults is about 420. So, our approach reduces the fault space to 1/70 th of its original size, i.e. 98.6% reduction in the possible number of faults that would have to be inspected in a later fault correction process.
These graphs demonstrate that the fault coverage in general asymptotically approaches 100% coverage as the sequence length increases. Also, for rather short sequence lengths {4, 10}, the fault coverage is around {20%, 65%}, which is very efficient with such short sequence lengths. It can be noticed from the above histogram is that most of the average fault coverage values are around {15%, 65%}. So, even though we don't have control on the observed sequence, we still can have reasonably good fault coverage.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
A. Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how passive testing on a practical example (IPv6 mobility support) can be used in fault management for networks. Fault management includes fault detection, fault location, fault identification, and fault coverage. Previous work by Lee introduced fault detection based on passive testing for a single FSM model. Later work by Miller described how to extend the model to a CFSM model and how to add fault location capabilities based on passive testing. Our contribution is to introduce for both the FSM and the CFSM models an integrated fault management solution based on passive observations. Passive testing could be used first for fault detection, followed by fault location to determine a smaller region of the network containing the fault. Then using fault identification to reduce the number of faults that could have caused a network implementation to display faulty behavior. Finally, fault coverage results would provide some assurances as to how "good" the test was. In this section we summarize our conclusions and remarks on our contributions.
A mobile IPv6 network model was used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach on a practical example. Extensive simulation was done for this example over many simulation input/output sequences and many random injections of faults. This simulation demonstrated that:
For fault detection capability the results in section 4 demonstrate that the average time to detect a fault in our experiment is quite low (between 4 and 9 steps). That is, it does not take long for passive testing to detect a fault For fault location information, the results show that our approach -in most of the cases-reduces the suspected faulty region. Thus, one obtains a reduction in the amount of work required for the active corrective phase.
The set of identified possible faults can be determined after only a very modest number of steps once a fault is detected, and also that considerable reduction in the number of possible faults giving rise to the observed sequence is obtained by our approach Thus, simplifying the following tests aimed at uniquely identifying and correcting the fault. In fact in some cases the passive testing identifies the unique fault.
For fault coverage, good fault coverage can be achieved in general, although passive testing has no control over the observed input/output sequence. Generally, fault coverage increases as the sequence length increases, since this potentially increases the number of visited transitions.
B. Possible Extensions
There are a number of issues and problems that could be investigated further. Some of these are briefly discussed in what follows.
More than one fault: Multiple faults in the system will complicate the process of fault management.
The timing of faults: is included as a new dimension to our model. Although the real-time dimension might appear orthogonal to our fault management work, it could still add robustness to our passive testing results. Real-time measurements in passive testing could provide "changes in performance" rather than "faulty indication". Along with our passive testing suite (fault detection, location, identification and coverage), this might enable one to decide when and where the performance flaw happens and provide some guidance to take corrective actions.
